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1 INTRODUCTION
At the height of the American civil rights movement, just one year after Pres. Lyndon Baines
Johnson declared his “unconditional war on poverty” and three months before the passing of
the landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965, US Rep. Jamie Whitten of Mississippi delivered a
speech at the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Delta Council in May 1965. Angered by the
intensification of voting rights activism and the looming poverty program in Mississippi,
Whitten called attention to the power of the Delta Council, which controlled the region’s
development projects and initiatives, to protect the state’s white supremacist system from
“militant agitators.” He proclaimed to the group and other guests that, in his opinion, the
struggle to attain voting rights for Blacks was “merely a front for a massive takeover by militant
agitators” to obtain power “to control industry, agriculture, and even labor.” He encouraged
the all-white council, who at the time had over three thousand members, to “continue to show
restraint and respect for the law in the hope that, as it becomes clear to the rest of the country
that the South is only a beachhead to these radical leaders for a take-over nation, the laws will
be changed.”1
Whitten’s speech echoed the beliefs of those who held the most power in his district: the
state’s emblematic white supremacist groups—the community-based White Citizens’ Council
and the Mississippi legislature-sanctioned State Sovereignty Commission in particular—claimed
that the rise of voting rights activism threatened the social, economic, and political lives of the
white planter and middle classes in the Mississippi Delta. According to Whitten, this uproar in
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support for voting rights was a critical component of the larger civil rights agenda initiated by
the Brown decision of 1954, which he described as a “downhill road to integration,
amalgamation, and ruin.”2 Thus, to ensure that the “militant agitators” did not take control of
“industry, agriculture, and even labor,” a group of three powerful Mississippi congressmen—
Jamie Whitten, Sen. John Stennis, and Sen. James Eastland—ignited a war against the War on
Poverty. As part of President Johnson’s Great Society campaign of 1964, the War on Poverty
promised to address and eradicate hunger throughout the nation by making it the “urgent
business of all men and women of every race and every religion and every region.”3 However, in
a place like Mississippi, specifically the Delta and plantation counties, the eradication of hunger
through antipoverty programs threatened the politics of white supremacy.

Senators John Stennis (left) and James O. Eastland (right) (James O. Eastland Collection, Archives and Special
Collections, J.D. Williams Library, The University of Mississippi [mum00117_b01_f18_001])
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Most studies of Mississippi during the American civil rights era focus almost exclusively on the
strategies and tactics of proponents of the movement in response to white resistance and
violence. Lunch counter sit-ins in Jackson, marches in the Delta, demonstrations in Oxford, and
boycotts in the southwest and southeast regions of the state are often rehearsed when people
learn about the Mississippi movement. While these studies extend our understanding of the
struggle for civil rights in the state, they simultaneously limit our understanding of white
resistance to the movement. This resistance took many forms, and local, state, and national
actors in Mississippi used “food power”—the use of food as a weapon or an element of
power—to maintain white supremacy and undermine the civil rights movement.

Counter Histories, Jackson, Mississippi. Courtesy the Southern Foodways Alliance
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/110376795

In his 1978 article “Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food,” political scientist
Peter Wallensteen situated food power within a US context and described how food as an
economic commodity can be used as weapon.4 According to Wallensteen, since economic
commodities are necessary to maintain life, they can also be used to threaten it if “effectively
used” as a military weapon.5 Thus, food as an economic weapon, like military weapons, “can be
used to punish enemies and reward friends.”6 Drawing on Wallensteen, legal scholars Aeyal
Gross and Tamar Feldman argue that “food is not merely an economic commodity, not only
because of its essentiality to life, but also because of its significance to human existence: our
cultural experiences, our family and communal lives, our pleasures, and our bodies.”7 They use
the term food power to describe “situations in which one State seeks a coercive advantage over
a target country by manipulating the volume and timing of its own food exports, such as placing
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a selective embargo on food exports, with the aim of punishing the target country or forcing it
to change its policy.”8
In Food Power: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Food System, historian Bryan L.
McDonald further delineated the ways in which the US has used food power as coercive tactic
in times of international crisis. For example, during the American civil rights era, the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) revealed its stance on food power in the agriculture
handbook Guide to Civil Defense Management in the Food Industry.9 Orville Freeman, John F.
Kennedy’s Secretary of Agriculture, wrote in the foreword that “the history of mankind and the
records of his wars clearly demonstrate that food . . . is a prime weapon, a prime target, and a
prime element of survival.” Recognizing the significance of this statement, McDonald wrote,
“Freeman’s attribution of the centrality of food to conflict is part of a long tradition recognizing
that food, and the ability to control availability, access, utilization, and stability of food, could
be vitally important to the legitimacy and security of states.”10 Moreover, McDonald points to
the world food crisis of the 1970s and the food embargo in response to the oil crisis as
examples of the US exerting its food power in the global arena.11 According to McDonald, food
power can even be used “indirectly, in the form of trade or humanitarian assistance, or directly
in the form of giving or withholding food in times of crisis.”12 Gross and Feldman similarly
argued that food power can be “exercised not only through direct control over food supply and
food availability, but also by impacting people’s access to adequate food.”13

The congressional white power structure in Mississippi, led by Whitten, Eastland,
and Stennis, used food power to manipulate any efforts of the War on Poverty to
uplift poor rural Black communities in the Delta.
In this essay, I transpose the concept of food power into the context of local politics and
inequality in the Mississippi civil rights era to interrogate how local, state, and national actors
converged to use food as a weapon to stabilize what they saw a civil rights crisis. To be clear,
for white supremacists and pro-segregationists in Mississippi, the development of the civil
rights movement in the Magnolia State was a “racial crisis” that threatened the white power
structure and the planter class. Thus, the congressional white power structure in Mississippi,
led by Whitten, Eastland, and Stennis, used food power to manipulate any efforts of the War on
Poverty to uplift poor rural Black communities in the Delta. Such a move to sustain white
supremacy made the massive white resistance movement in Mississippi, as historian J. Todd
Moye has stated, “sui generis in the heady days of the civil rights revolution.” 14
The story of Mississippi’s war against the War on Poverty is instructive and entangled in the
political, social, and economic backdrop of the struggle for civil rights in Mississippi. It illustrates
how actors in the congressional white power structure in Mississippi used food power, directly
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stimulated by political maneuverings, to manipulate policies and programs at the intersection
of agriculture, food, health, and welfare to maintain white supremacy and thwart any efforts of
Black advancement in the state. Therefore, to tell this story I track the political utilization of
food power by exploring a wide range of archival materials and scholarly works on the
Mississippi movement, tying together narratives that are often told separately. Specifically, this
story focuses on two specific instances during the post-1965 civil rights struggle when the
congressional white power structure in Mississippi used food power to manipulate Head Start
and respond to Sen. Robert F. Kennedy’s “discovery” of hunger in the Mississippi Delta. This use
of food power by the white power structure provides a critical understanding of the social,
economic, and political forces that worked against civil rights activism and enhances broader
public and scholarly understandings of the American civil rights movement.

2 MISSISSIPPI FOOD POWER: WHITE SUPREMACY, FARM POLICY, AND FOOD PROGRAMS
The development of organized white resistance and opposition to the American civil rights
movement in Mississippi played a critical role in the food power wielded by the state’s
congressional white power structure throughout the postwar era. Amplified by the historical
politics of white supremacy and the fear of integration, opponents of civil rights reignited the
southern quest for “states’ rights” built on the state’s one-party system, which at the time was
the Democratic Party.15 Here, states’ rights can be defined as “local autonomy, diminution of
federal power, and interposition of state authority between the citizen and supposed excesses
of the national government.”16 However, in the case of Mississippi, as historian James W. Silver
has shown, the state used federal power to protect its social and economic system—
characterized by the plantation system and rurality—to, in fact, destroy local autonomy and
thwart the advancement of Blacks in the case of slavery in the 1850s and civil rights in the
1950s. In the case of the 1960s and 1970s, local, state, and federal actors in Mississippi—
influenced by what Black studies scholar Clyde Woods described as the “Delta plantation
bloc”—crystalized the ideology of white supremacy at the intersection of federal farm policy
and food access to undermine Black insurgency and self-determination through antipoverty
programs.
The Delta plantation bloc represented a powerful group of white male leaders who were mostly
part of the white planter and middle classes who sought to sustain “white supremacist
attitudes, alliances, institutions, social policies, and economic programs.” Woods further claims
that “plantation bloc leaders asserted their superiority of the plantation system and of their
leadership while continually advocating the expansion of their monopoly over agriculture,
manufacturing, banking, land, and water. They also sought to preserve their monopoly over
local, county, and state finances. Their commitment to the elimination of federal programs
designed to lessen ethnic and class exploitation was, moreover, unwavering.”17
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To sustain the pace of their dominance over Delta and other plantation counties, the planation
bloc created the White Citizens’ Council in 1954 and the State Sovereignty Commission in 1956.
At the community level, the White Citizens’ Council was designed to maintain segregation
through economic control. At the state level, the State Sovereignty Commission provided
detailed surveillance of civil rights activities. Together, these two groups fought viciously to
maintain segregation, which represented, as prominent member of the plantation bloc and
founder of the White Citizens’ Council Robert “Tut” Patterson stated, “the freedom to choose
one’s associates, Americanism, State Sovereignty, and the survival of the white race.”18
Simultaneously, the bloc relied on the political maneuverings of powerful national actors who
were also landowners in the region to protect their domination of the region: Jamie Whitten of
Tallahatchie County, known as “the permanent secretary of agriculture” who served over fifty
years in congress representing most of the Delta; James Eastland of Sunflower County, who
served as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which allowed him to single-handedly
control the results of nearly all of the civil rights bills after 1956 until his retirement in 1978; and
John Stennis of Kemper County who served over forty years in congress and who chaired the
Senate Appropriations Committee in the 1960s and the Senate Armed Services Committee
during the Vietnam War.19 Among the most powerful of them all, Whitten leveraged his clout at
the national level in Washington to enhance the lives of white cotton planters in the Delta at
the expense of poor rural Blacks. As a cotton planter himself—and chair of the powerful House
Agricultural Appropriations subcommittee at the time—Whitten understood both the financial
and racial politics of the crop. For example, as political scientist Mary Summers pointed out,
under Whitten’s leadership, cotton remained the costliest among all federal agricultural subsidy
programs.20 Moreover, Whitten’s political maneuverings between the 1940s and 1960s created
conditions that exacerbated poverty, food insecurity and hunger among poor rural Blacks in the
Delta.

A 1966 television campaign commercial in which Sen. James O. Eastland touts his record on civil rights. (James O.
Eastland Collection, Archives and Special Collections, J.D. Williams Library, The University of Mississippi
[eastland_2_quad_5])
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/343245871
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In late 1945, the Mississippi congressional delegation received a scathing report on the Delta
county of Coahoma, written by southern sociologist Frank Alexander. The report, which was
overseen by Arthur F. Raper of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE), found that the
county’s dependence on plantation politics and white supremacy was linked to the increasing
reliance of Blacks on the federal government for assistance for their basic needs such as
food.21 “Many southern congressmen saw the Coahoma County report together with the BAE’s
release of its postwar conversion plans for the cotton South in 1944 as acts of war,” Summers
posited.22 In response, during the House agricultural appropriations hearings in 1946, Whitten
led a counterattack, accusing the BAE of trying to disrupt and rework “the social set-up of my
section of the Nation or the rest of it with racial intermingling.” He accused them of making
friends with groups like the NAACP, which was interested in understanding and dismantling the
power dynamics of the plantation economy in the South, which kept Black farmers inferior to
and dependent on the white planter class.23
During the mid to late 1940s, moreover, Whitten used his legislative power to block a number
of potential USDA studies that attempted to identify social and economic problems of Black
army veterans returning from World War II to the South. Pulitzer Prize winning reporter and
journalist Nick Kotz argued that these moves by Whitten “helped insure that Agriculture
Department farm policy would never seriously include consideration of the effects of its
programs on sharecroppers or farmworkers.”24 By the 1960s, Whitten’s power and influence
allowed his district to receive $23.5 million dollars in individual federal farm subsidies to reduce
acreage in cotton production, which only went .3 percent of the population, while constituents
who lived below the poverty threshold, approximately 59 percent, received only $4 million
dollars in federal food relief aid.25 Such imbalances perpetuated poverty, food insecurity,
hunger, and malnutrition, and infuriated civil rights activists who understood the centrality of
federal food relief to the diets of Whitten’s impoverished constituents—mostly displaced Black
farmers, sharecroppers, or day-laborers. Moreover, Whitten’s maneuverings also killed a
federal program designed to teach displaced Black sharecroppers and farmworkers how to
drive tractors during Orville Freeman’s tenure as the US Secretary of Agriculture.26 “As a result,”
Kotz noted, “farm policies which have consistently ignored their toll on millions of Black poor
have contributed to a rural-urban migration, to a civil rights revolution, and to the ruin of
Americans.”27
Political scientist Don F. Hadwiger shared similar insights to Kotz on the relationship between
race, federal farm policy, and the civil rights movement: “The civil rights revolution exposed the
severe class discrimination which both Negroes and poor whites had experienced and
emphasized the Jim Crow practices under which Negroes alone had suffered.”28 Hadwiger
found that southern domination throughout each congressional agriculture committee fueled
both the protection of white rural farmers in the South and resistance to civil rights and
antipoverty projects that sought to uplift those who were marginalized. “Even the domestic

Published by eGrove, 2019

7

Study the South, Art. 11 [2019]

food-assistance programs were to be used only to dispose of farm surpluses, to maintain a
compliant and low-cost work force, and to bargain for urban votes on farm bills,” he
explained.29 The use of farm surplus exclusively for domestic food assistance programs, such as
the federal commodities food program and the Food Stamp Program, inextricably linked federal
farm, food, and welfare policy.

Food coupon, 1967 Series

As a result, the most basic problem with US food assistance programs was that they were “the
products of political compromise between legislators who represented hungry voters in the
Northeast and those who represented ambitious farmers in the Midwest and South,” historian
Felicia Kornbluh argued. “In this compromise, farm interests had the upper hand.”30 This
compromise produced two consequences that detrimentally impacted poor rural Blacks.
Kornbluh writes,
The leading purpose of these programs was to sustain the prices of agricultural
commodities. . . . Neither commodity food nor the Food Stamp Program was “designed
primarily to help the poor.” Therefore, USDA administrators did not take it as their
charge to correct the limited nutritional value or appeal of the commodities they
distributed; they fulfilled the most significant of their objectives by taking commodities
out of the for-profit market so that prices did not drop too far. The second consequence
of the unequal compromise that underlay the food programs under USDA was that they
were administered locally and at county discretion. Large farmers dominated the local
governments charged with deciding whether to adopt the program.31
In the Delta, the administration of local food programs by large planters and local governments
perpetuated the vulnerability of poor rural Blacks who relied heavily on free food from the
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surplus commodities program.32 Such programs were not mandated at the local level by the
USDA, however, federal law prohibited counties to implement both the free food program and
the food stamp program.33 While civil rights activists favored the surplus commodities food
program, the white planter class and local white grocers preferred to administer the food
stamp program. In Sunflower County, the birthplace of the White Citizens Council, Fannie Lou
Hamer and other civil rights activists opposed the food stamp program and organized a
campaign in the late 1960s against the program, circulating a petition asking for a free food
program to be implemented in the county.34 On paper, the food stamp program had much to
offer poor Black sharecroppers and farmworkers: each recipient could buy food stamps, use
them, and then receive more stamps to purchase more food. Essentially, this program was
designed to increase the purchasing power of the poor. “In practice, though, the food stamp
plan amounted to virtual extortion from the poor,” journalist Nick Kotz argued. The program
was championed by USDA economists “with the rationale that it would provide more money to
the farmer than did the commodity programs.”35
Moreover, the food stamp program was also championed by plantation owner and Sen. James
“Big Jim” Eastland, who historian James C. Cobb described as “the staunchest segregationist in
the United States,” as a way to boost local business for white grocers. As a card-carrying
member of the White Citizens’ Council, Eastland was the epitome of the group. Not only did his
power reach all the way to US Senate, he was also one of the largest landowners in Jamie
Whitten’s congressional district.36 He owned five thousand acres in Sunflower County and
directly benefitted from the USDA’s cotton subsidies and acreage reduction programs. For
instance, in 1967 the Eastland plantation received a $168,524.52 cotton subsidy to reduce its
acreage in production of the crop. While these instances were not unusual for Delta planters
under the leadership of Jamie Whitten in the 1960s, such dynamics coupled with the Delta’s
reliance on mechanization to produce cotton and the region’s racist sociopolitical environment
caused many Blacks to leave the county. From 1960 to 1970, the Sunflower County Black
population decreased by 7,758 and by another 1,670 between 1970 and 1980.37
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James Eastland (center) with Jamie Whitten (left) and Frank Barber (right) at Mississippi Economic Council
Convention (James O. Eastland Collection, Archives and Special Collections, J.D. Williams Library, The University of
Mississippi [mum00117_b01_f41_001])

During the 1964 congressional debate over whether to create the food stamp program,
Eastland worked to support the food stamp bill and had a conversation with Lyndon B. Johnson
about white grocery store merchants who would benefit from the program. He explained to
Johnson that the commodities program in the “nigra areas” caused many merchants not to
make a profit although the Blacks who worked on plantations had income to purchase
food.38 Using his plantation as an example, Eastland stated, “Now you take the niggers on my
property: they got plenty of money, but every damn one of ’em will line up and get commodity.
The merchants in my areas want food stamps, because they get a cut out of it.”39
Morris Lewis Jr. of the Lewis Grocer Company in Indianola was representative of white grocery
store merchants that Senator Eastland was referring to. Lewis, a financial supporter of the
Mississippi Sovereignty Commission who owned Sunflower Food Stores and once served as the
president of Mississippi Economic Council, was known for his campaign to dismantle the surplus
commodity food program in Mississippi in support of the food stamp program.40 In 1962 Lewis
wrote a letter to four hundred retailors across Mississippi asking them to join his efforts against
the commodities program and to garner support for the then food stamp pilot program. In his
letter, he described the commodities program as “a disgrace to the county, the State of

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studythesouth/11

10

Smith: Mississippi's War Against the War on Poverty: Food Power, Hunger,

Mississippi, and the federal government” and a “growing threat to the free enterprise
system.”41 Lewis further lamented that the free food distributed by the commodities program
caused “the federal government to enter in the food business in competition with the tax
paying food retailers and wholesalers in this state.”42
The letter was quoted in a number of newspapers in the Mississippi Delta, including
the Greenville Delta Democrat-Times and the Indianola Enterprise-Tocsin. One article
commented that “Lewis suggested that since the responsibility for initiating any kind of food
program lies with the boards of supervisors, the retailers talk to their supervisors in favor of
making the change from commodity to food stamps.”43 Such power dynamics further
exacerbated hunger and starvation among poor rural Blacks in so far as when Sunflower County
made the switch from commodities to food stamps in the spring of 1966, over ten thousand
people were unable to access food. As food historian John T. Edge observed, “Delta residents
went hungrier, children starved.”44
Rather than go hungry, poor Blacks in the county were forced to participate in a newly
developed government loan program to purchase stamps or establish credit with local white
grocers like Morris Lewis Jr. Civil rights activists in the county saw the process of applying for a
loan or credit to purchase food “as one more way for poor Black families to incur debt they
could not pay.”45 This situation increased Black dependence on both the white grocery store
structure and on plantation owners in the Delta. Historian Mark Newman noted, “In some
cases, planters often certified their workers’ income, which determined their eligibility for food
stamps, and thus retained a powerful influence over the workforce. Some grocery stores only
accepted food stamps for the most expensive brands of food and . . . raised prices when the
county entered the food stamp program.”46
The all-white Sunflower County board of supervisors and other county officials used the food
stamp program in ways that stripped Blacks of their dignity and autonomy in order to maintain
white supremacy. In some instances, as Angela Jill Cooley points out, poor Blacks who mostly
worked as day laborers or domestics were subject to various validation procedures beyond
getting income approval from white plantation owners, which included allowing them to
purchase only certain kinds of foods that were “considered to be fit for a poor black
family.”47 Drawing on a report from staff at Sunflower County Progress, the county federal
social service agency that ran the Emergency Food and Medical program (EF&M), which helped
poor people gain access to food stamps, Cooley wrote that the staff reported that they paid for
groceries selected by a beneficiary family, and the family purchased roast beef. The staff
considered roast beef to be too expensive compared to bologna or neckbones, on which they
thought beneficiaries should subsist. As a result, program officials started selecting and
purchasing food for needy families. The sole concern seemed to be price, and perhaps the
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quality of food to be fit for a poor black family. The EF&M staff made no mention for the
preference, nutrition, or autonomy of the community members they served.48
However, the food stamp program was not the only program that the congressional white
power structure in Mississippi sought to manipulate to maintain white dominance. They also
used their food power to attack a War on Poverty program, Project Head Start, that which
addressed the food and health needs of poor rural Black children while supplying jobs to
mothers.

Head Start to Confidence [17 min.], a Project Head Start training film produced by the Office of Economic
Opportunity by the Department of Psychology, Vassar College.
Link to video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmmDfE9jr68

3 CO-OPTING PROJECT HEAD START: JOHN STENNIS VS. THE CHILD DEVELOPMENT
GROUP OF MISSISSIPPI
In August 1964, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act, which established the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO), headed by Sargent Shriver, the founder of the Peace Corps under
President Kennedy’s administration.49 At the foundation of programs initiated by the OEO were
community-based agencies under the Community Action Program (CAP). This program was
designed to support community-based solutions to poverty by giving poor communities
financial support to support their needs and realities.50 For rural Blacks in Mississippi, the
program offered more than just an opportunity to address their needs; it allowed them to
exercise autonomy from the white power structure that controlled every aspect of their lives.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studythesouth/11

12

Smith: Mississippi's War Against the War on Poverty: Food Power, Hunger,

Realizing this, the congressional white power structure in Mississippi demonstrated its blatant
disregard for the poverty legislation by unanimously voting against the Economic Opportunity
Act and dismantling any policies or programs that addressed the food realities of Blacks or used
OEO funds to empower poor rural Blacks to control their own lives.51
In the summer of 1965, the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM) received a $1.5
million grant from the OEO to start a seven-week preschool training program under the
national Head Start program. Created by Dr. Tom Levin, a psychoanalyst who worked as part of
the “medical arm” of the civil rights movement during Freedom Summer in 1964, the CDGM
was a statewide poverty organization that served over six thousand children through eightyfour centers in twenty-four counties, making it the nation’s largest Head Start program at the
time. Children who participated in the program received educational training, medical care, and
two hot meals a day. For impoverished participants in the Mississippi Delta, who were mostly
Black, this program was located in freedom centers and houses established by civil rights
organizations and was the only way many of them could access nutritious food, health care,
and education. Moreover, staff recruited to run the program were mostly local women and civil
rights activists who served as directors and teachers of the centers, allowing many of them to
escape dependency on the white power structure for the first time in their lives.52
One year prior to the development of the CDGM’s Head Start program, Levin began to lay the
groundwork for the organization and knew that he would need the support of local people who
worked with groups like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Invited by Jim
Forman of SNCC to attend the group’s 1964 staff meeting at Waveland, Levin expressed to the
group how he envisioned a learning environment for poor Black children that would “be much
more than simply early childhood education.” It would also “act as focus to organize a
community around their social aspirations.”53 While SNCC did not publicly endorse the CDGM,
historian John Dittmer noted that Levin was able to convince SNCC member Frank Smith to be
the director of community staff.54

The advancement of a Black antipoverty agenda made the Child Development
Group of Mississippi a target for the Mississippi congressional white power
structure and the State Sovereignty Commission.
As a result, many movement activists, such as Unita Blackwell and L. C. Dorsey in the Delta were
recruited to join the CDGM’s efforts and established centers in their communities. 55 The
sponsoring agency of the Head Start program became Mary Holmes Junior College, a
historically Black private school in the northeastern part of the state, and its central office was
located at the headquarters of two dominant civil rights groups, the Delta Ministry and the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) in Mount Beulah. Although the CDGM’s Head

Published by eGrove, 2019

13

Study the South, Art. 11 [2019]

Start programs were not the only ones operating in the state in the summer of 1965, their
programs were almost exclusively led by people who were public supporters of the civil rights
movement and saw this antipoverty work as, in the words of L. C. Dorsey, “a continuation of
the civil rights movement.”56 This clear connection to the movement and the advancement of a
Black antipoverty agenda made the CDGM a target for the Mississippi congressional white
power structure and the State Sovereignty Commission. While the local white power structure
in the Delta refused to support the program and often harassed CDGM workers, the
congressional white power structure decided to attack the group from within the federal
government itself.
Less than two months after the start of the CDGM’s Head Start program, John Stennis began a
powerful and successful crusade against the organization. Stennis, who once declared that
“imported racial zealots and agitators” desired the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was a powerful
figure in the Senate Appropriations Committee.57 This committee was the sole source of
funding for both the OEO and the Vietnam War, which President Johnson relied on for
financing.58 Stennis’s influence as chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and later chair
of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the Vietnam War allowed him to use funding
for the Vietnam War as a way to keep government officials in the OEO and Johnson from
interfering with the business of Mississippi. Such power in the Senate yielded constant
devastating blows to the CDGM and further exacerbated poverty, hunger, and malnutrition
throughout the state.
On June 29, 1965, Stennis demanded that the Appropriations Committee send a group of
accountants and inspectors to investigate the CDGM’s operations. Stennis’s desire to send this
group came on the heels of charges made against the CDGM earlier that month regarding the
misuse of grant funds to support the civil rights movement by Mississippi congressmen William
Colmer and John Bell Williams, who coined the term “Black Monday” to describe
the Brown decision.59 Moreover, to assist the group of inspectors, the State Sovereignty
Commission provided them, and eventually the OEO, with information gathered from two
informants placed in the CDGM’s central offices.60 On that same day, Mississippi governor Paul
Johnson sent correspondence to Sargent Shriver describing the CDGM as “an effort on the part
of extremists and agitators to subvert the lawful authority in Mississippi and create division and
dissention between the races.”61
By the end of July 1965 Stennis’s committee discovered that the CDGM had provided bail
money for a few employees who were jailed for participating in MFDP civil rights
demonstrations in Jackson. The CDGM had “improperly recorded as bail money salary advances
it had made to staff members arrested for participating in MFDP protests during their free
time.”62 Whether the CDGM directly provided bail for employees or “salary advances” didn’t
matter. Stennis used this information to accuse the organization of misusing funds and
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petitioned the OEO to withhold all future funding. However, instead of withholding funds from
the CDGM, the OEO attempted to force the group to relocate from their headquarters on a site
operated by the movement to Mary Holmes Junior College as a way to appease Stennis, but to
no avail. Activists and CDGM representatives fought against the change of location since the
college was located over a hundred miles from most of the active civil rights movement sites.
As a result, this further infuriated Stennis and “poisoned the atmosphere between OEO
administrators in Washington and CDGM staff members.”63
Nonetheless, after months of fighting the Mississippi congressional white power structure and
OEO officials, the CDGM was able to still provide services to their communities and secured a
$5.6 million grant from OEO in February 1966 to continue programming into the summer
months. While Stennis, joined by Eastland, complained to the OEO that the organization was
virtually funding communist efforts of “extreme leftist civil rights and beatnik groups in our
state,” the CDGM continued to operate.64 Yet, the summer 1965 struggle for the CDGM caused
members of the Delta Ministry to characterize the War on Poverty as a “war against the poor”
that contributed “to the further rape and emasculation of the Negro community, enabling the
white political structure to intensify even more strongly its hold on community life.”65 Although
the CDGM faced constant accusations, by October 1966 the program had spread to thirty
counties. Yet, the OEO never fully regained support for the CDGM after Stennis and his
committee attacked the organization and started to “comply with the demands of the
Mississippi political establishment.”66 As a result, John Stennis and Gov. Paul Johnson
developed two poverty programs, one at the local level and one at the state level, to redirect
state funding from OEO and block the CDGM from receiving such funds.
At the local level, Stennis and Johnson used OEO funds to establish the flagship War on Poverty
initiative—the Community Action Program—in counties throughout the state. While the OEO
“envisioned CAP as a cooperative effort by government, the private sector, and poor people to
attack the problems of poverty at the most basic level,” John Dittmer contended, “white
Mississippians wanted nothing to do with the program in which Blacks participated as equals.”
However, due to the controversy surrounding the CDGM, “Governor Johnson and his allies
came to see that by setting up CAP agencies in Mississippi communities, local whites could
prevent the flow of federal dollars into programs like the CDGM.”67 As a result, the county
boards of supervisors, who were mostly plantation owners and white supremacists, appointed
all CAP board members in the Delta to advance an anti-Black agenda.68 They selected only
whites or wealthy Blacks, mostly men, who were “always either silent or compliant when faced
with numerous and powerful whites,” one OEO investigator observed.69 For example, in Bolivar
County, the CAP board, composed of eight whites and eight Blacks, voted to withhold OEO
funds from the CDGM in the county, which resulted in the program using unpaid volunteers to
run centers for over a thousand children.70 Instances such as these occurred throughout the
Delta.
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At the state level, the Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. (MAP) organization was developed in
September 1966 to eventually replace the CDGM. The twelve-member board appointed by
Governor Johnson, which included no women nor poor people, was chaired by Owen Cooper, a
successful businessman from Yazoo City who was chair of the Mississippi Economic Council and
the Mississippi Chemical Corporation, which at the time was one of the largest agro-chemical
companies in the world. For the MAP board Johnson also selected wealthy Delta plantation
owners Leroy Price and Oscar Carr Jr., state NAACP president Aaron Henry, and Charles Evers,
brother of slain civil rights activist Medgar Wiley Evers. Less than three weeks after the board
was selected, the Jackson Daily News released a story with the headline “12 Man Board
Replaces CDGM.” This publicly signaled the fate of the CDGM.71
By October 1966 the OEO replaced CDGM director Tom Levin and forced the group to relocate
its headquarters to the Milner Building in downtown Jackson, which housed the Mississippi
division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At last, the OEO had finally given into the
demands of Stennis and his committee after receiving a critical report of the CDGM created by
Senate investigator Paul Cotter. In the report, Cotter found that the CDGM centers were being
run by staff that “clearly fall into the category of extremists” and could be using the children “as
pawns to serve other purposes,” such as spreading the doctrine of some civil rights
activists.72 For example, the idea of Black Power was linked to the Head Start program in a
cartoon drawn by Bob Howie of the Jackson Daily News that fall. The cartoon depicted a
teacher standing in front of a classroom pointing at a blackboard with the words “BLACK
POWER” written on it while a student with a T-shirt on with the words “HEAD-START” looked at
the blackboard attentively.73

By the spring of 1968 the OEO cut Head Start funding in Mississippi by 25 percent
in the context of looming conversations about financing the Vietnam War, a move
dictated by John Stennis.
On October 3, 1966, the OEO informed the CDGM that their new grant proposal was rejected
and that they would not receive any more funding. Eight days later MAP received $3 million to
operate in thirteen counties and another $10 million from Sargent Shriver. In response, activists
mobilized to protest and demand that the CDGM be funded, however, by this time the
Mississippi congressional white power structure had already won. One year later, after
countless attacks and charges against the CDGM by the Mississippi congressional white power
structure, the State Sovereignty Commission, and in turn, the OEO, the organization had
dissolved, and remaining funds were transferred to MAP in December 1967. By the spring of
1968 the OEO cut Head Start funding in Mississippi by 25 percent in the context of looming
conversations about financing the Vietnam War, a move dictated by John Stennis, who
controlled the financial underpinnings of the entire federal government.74 This left many CDGM
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supporters and civil rights activists even more suspicious of federal intervention in community
affairs, especially in its efforts to address poverty, hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity.

4 (UN)DISCOVERING HUNGER: JAMIE WHITTEN VS. THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE
In the midst of the battle between the CDGM and the Mississippi congressional white power
structure, the confluence of federal farm aid to the white planter class and federal food
assistance to poor rural Blacks attracted national attention in April 1967 when Senators Robert
F. Kennedy of New York and Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania “discovered hunger” in the Delta. 75 As
chairmen of the Senate Committee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, Clark scheduled
hearings at the Heidelberg Hotel in Jackson to learn more about the CDGM and assess “the
effectiveness of the Mississippi phase of President Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty . . . [and]
determine by the hearings the success of the state poverty program and decide which of the
programs should be continued.”76 Historian Felicia Kornbluh added that Clark ultimately
wanted “to illustrate the positive side of the War on Poverty.”77 The CDGM’s Head Start
program was the largest in the country at the time, and coming off of its summer 1965 success,
it was used as a model to show how funds from the War on Poverty could have positive impacts
on communities. However, for poor rural Blacks and civil rights activists in Mississippi, the plight
of the CDGM was already leaving a bitter taste in their mouths.
On April 10, 1967, NAACP civil rights attorney and activist Marian Wright Edelman testified
before the Senate Subcommittee, which included Jennings Randolph of West Virginia, Claiborne
Pell of Rhode Island, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin,
Winston L. Prouty of Vermont, Jacob K. Kavitz of New York and George Murphy of
California.78 Followed by powerful testimonies about the inadequacies of state-administered
federal food assistance programs by activists Fannie Lou Hamer (misspelled as “Hammer” in the
congressional record) and Unita Blackwell, who were both a part of the “Community Leaders
Panel,” Edelman further spoke about the terrible social and economic conditions that many
poor rural Blacks in the Delta lived in, and she petitioned the committee to travel to the area to
see the poverty for themselves.79 To this point, Delta poverty was virtually “undiscovered” and
silenced by the political maneuverings of the Mississippi congressional white power structure.
Any time the issue of hunger came up at the national level, for example, Governor Johnson,
Jamie Whitten and James Eastland would deny such instances. In one televised interview,
Johnson went on record saying, “No one is starving in Mississippi. The Nigra Women I see are so
fat they shine,” attempting to dismiss the prevalence of poverty in the state.80
Yet, when Sen. Jacob Javitz asked Edelman whether she felt as if the counties in the Delta
“switched to food stamps in order to pressure the very Negroes who needed food the most,”
her response shifted the dynamics of the hearing. Moreover, she exposed the conditions
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created by the local white power structure’s support of the food stamp program and its
campaign against the commodities program:
That’s right, Senator Javits, and many people feel too that it’s part of an overall State
policy to not respond to the overwhelming need in the Delta in order to force these
Negroes out because they don’t want them here. . . . People who have participated in
civil rights have been cut off from welfare, and we have been able to document this in
many counties. The whole welfare department is simply not functioning to serve the
needs for the poor and particularly in the Negro community. . . . [S]o far the poverty
program has done nothing to change the basic economic structure, which has to be
changed, or to really deal with the root problem that is causing poverty. . . . I wish the
Senators would have a chance to go and just look at the empty cupboards in the Delta. .
. . Starvation is a major, major problem now.81
In response to her testimony, Senator Clark and Senator Kennedy decided to conduct a tour of
the Mississippi Delta, drawing national attention to hunger and poverty among Black
Mississippians. “It would seem that one of the first things the subcommittee should do when
we get back to Washington,” Senator Clark stated, “is to place the facts of this hearing which
have been developed this afternoon about hunger in Mississippi, the inadequacy of the food
stamp program, the totally inadequate diet in those areas where food is being given away,
before the Department of Agriculture, and insist on a prompt answer as to what can be done
about it.”82
Three days after the hearing, Kennedy and Clark returned to Washington, DC, and met with
Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to discuss an intervention for the Delta. They pleaded
with Secretary Orville to send emergency aid to the Delta since they had made a promise to
Wright and other poor Mississippians that they would do just that. Ultimately, Kennedy and
Clark were confronted with strong opposition from Eastland and Whitten.83 As a result, the
senators fought for Mississippi and were able to influence the passing of the of the Public
Health Service Act (Partnership for Health Amendment) of 1967, which authorized the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to conduct a six-month “comprehensive survey of
serious hunger and malnutrition and health problems related thereto in the United
States.”84 However, they underestimated Mississippi’s white power structure, which operated
beyond the state level into the department.85
Shortly after the passing of the amendment to the Public Health Service Act, Whitten was
notified by George Irving, director of the USDA’s Agricultural Research Service, that Mississippi
was on the list of states to be surveyed. Whitten immediately saw this decision as a potential
“smear campaign against Mississippi,” and worked to remove Mississippi’s name from the list.
As a result, the state was removed from the list and would not be a part of the hunger survey,
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which further exacerbated the living conditions of Blacks in the Delta. “This kind of
bureaucratic-congressional maneuvering, exercised between the lines . . . in the quiet process
of hidden power,” Kotz remarked, demonstrated the food power wielded by Whitten in the
USDA.86
Whitten’s power prevailed throughout the late 1960s into the 1970s, and Mississippi remained
absent from any government-based intervention plans. His ability to control local, national, and
state politics ultimately contributed to the failure of the War on Poverty in the
Delta.87 Moreover, his devotion to undercutting any programs that would help the poor,
especially poor Blacks, was aligned with the tactics of the White Citizens’ Council. In doing so,
Whitten initiated a “cold war” against Black progress even before the start of the Mississippi
civil rights movement. In response to his influence on the lives of Black Mississippians, activists
like Fannie Lou Hamer sought to advance an agenda toward community sovereignty, which
recognized that the only true way to change the conditions that Blacks in the Delta lived in
would have to come from the communities themselves.
5 CONCLUSION
The story of Mississippi’s war against the War on Poverty is instructive. It illuminates the oftenoverlooked relationship between food, white supremacy, hunger, and poverty during the
American civil rights era. Yet, this relationship receives much less attention across scholarly and
public conversations on the movement. These conversations tend to focus on civil rights
activism and render strategies employed by white opponents invisible or peripheral. As a result,
relatively little is known about the use of food or even food power as a strategy to maintain
white supremacy. This strategy was designed to undermine post-1965 civil rights activism that
sought to address the economic and food realities of poor rural Blacks. While national actors of
the civil rights movement faded in to the periphery of the Mississippi struggle after the passage
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, local opponents of the movement took center stage. Led by
the political maneuverings and food power wielded by congressmen Jamie Whitten, James
Eastland, and John Stennis, opponents successfully dismantled antipoverty programs designed
to mitigate poverty and hunger in poor rural Black communities. Such efforts at all three levels
of government revealed a new wave of white resistance to the movement beyond the usual
tactics of media manipulation, violence, and economic intimidation.
Therefore, to understand this wave of white resistance in the post-1965 civil rights struggle,
new frameworks are needed to understand and analyze the many facets of white supremacy
during the civil rights era. By shifting our gaze to the politics and strategies employed by white
supremacists, I shed light on critical elements—such as the use of food power—of the civil
rights era that helps us fully understand the struggles of the past. In this way, food power could
also be used as a framework to reveal unexplored aspects of the civil rights era and illustrate
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how food, and the control over access to food, mattered to both proponents and opponents of
the movement. However, more scholarly work is needed to gain an understanding of the
legacies and implications of the relationship between food power, white supremacy, and the
civil rights movement. To do this, scholars will have to read the politics of white supremacy as
an integral part of not only the civil rights struggle in Mississippi but of the larger Black freedom
struggle and the political history of the United States.

President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” Speech (LBJ Presidential Library)
Link to video: https://youtu.be/x4Qc1VM80aQ

Bobby J. Smith II is a sociologist and currently a Chancellor’s Postdoctoral Fellow in the
Department of African American Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He
has a Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture, with a focus on agricultural economics from
Prairie View A&M University (2011), and he earned a Master of Science degree in agricultural
economics in 2013 and a PhD in development sociology in 2018 from Cornell University. His
research focuses on the relationship between food justice, agriculture, race, and inequality in
historical and contemporary contexts. He was the 2018 recipient of the Study the South
Fellowship sponsored by the Center for the Study of Southern Culture and the Department of
Archives and Special Collection at the University of Mississippi. Research for this essay was
supported in part by the Mississippi Department of Archives and History, the W. K. Kellogg
Foundation, and the Medgar and Myrlie Evers Institute.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studythesouth/11

20

Smith: Mississippi's War Against the War on Poverty: Food Power, Hunger,

This essay was supported by a Study the South Research Fellowship sponsored by the Center for
the Study of Southern Culture and the Department of Archives and Special Collections at the
University of Mississippi.
NOTES
I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Noliwe Rooks, professor, Africana studies, Cornell University,
and the reviewers for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
1. Clyde Adrian Woods, Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the
Mississippi Delta (London: Verso, 1998), 166.
2. James C. Cobb, “Somebody Done Nailed Us on the Cross”: Federal Farm and Welfare
Policy and the Civil Rights Movement in the Mississippi Delta, Journal of American
History 77, no. 3 (1990): 923.
3. Marcie Cohen Ferris, The Edible South: The Power of Food and the Making of an
American Region (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 285.
4. Peter Wallensteen, “Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food, Journal
of Peace Research 13, no. 4 (1976), 277–98.
5. Ibid., 277.
6. Ibid., 278.
7. Aeyal Gross and Tamar Feldman, “‘We Didn’t Want to Hear the Word Calories’:
Rethinking Food Security, Food Power, and Food Sovereignty—Lessons from the
Gaza Closure,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 33, No. 2, (2015): 433.
8. Ibid., 431.
9. United States Department of Agriculture, “Guide to Civil Defense Management in
the Food Industry,” Agriculture Handbook, Washington, DC: Agricultural Marketing
Service (November 1963): i.
10. Bryan McDonald, Food Power: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Food
System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 4.
11. Ibid., 6.
12. Ibid., 3.
13. Gross and Feldman, 380.
14. J. Todd Moye, Let the People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance
Movements in Sunflower County, Mississippi, 1945–1986 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2004), 33.
15. James W. Silver, Mississippi: The Closed Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1964), 6.

Published by eGrove, 2019

21

Study the South, Art. 11 [2019]

16. Ibid., 7.
17. Woods, 4–5.
18. Robert B. Patterson, “The Citizens’ Council—A History,” The Citizen: Official Journal
of the Citizens’ Councils of America 8 (January 1964): 8.
19. Woods, 198.
20. Mary Summers, “The New Deal Farm Programs: Looking for Reconstruction in
American Agriculture,” Agricultural History, 74, no. 2 (2000), 241–45.
21. Ibid., 252.
22. Ibid., 252.
23. Whitten qtd. in ibid., 253.
24. Nick Kotz. Let Them Eat Promises: The Politics of Hunger in America. (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969) 93.
25. Cobb, 923.
26. Moye, 168.
27. Kotz, 93.
28. Don F. Hadwiger, “The Freeman Administration and the Poor,” Agricultural
History 45, no. 1 (1971): 22.
29. Ibid., 22.
30. Felicia Kornbluh, “Food as a Civil Right: Hunger, Work, and Welfare in the South
after the Civil Rights Act,” Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the
Americas 12, no. 1–2 (2015): 143.
31. Ibid., 143–44.
32. Cobb, 922.
33. Angela Jill Cooley, “Freedom’s Farms: Activism and Sustenance in Rural Mississippi,”
in Dethroning the Deceitful Pork Chop: Rethinking African American Foodways from
Slavery to Obama, ed., J. J. Wallach (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2015)
208.
34. Ibid., 208.
35. Kotz, 52–54.
36. Cobb, 919.
37. Moye, 169.
38. Ibid., 112.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studythesouth/11

22

Smith: Mississippi's War Against the War on Poverty: Food Power, Hunger,

39. Qtd in ibid., 112.
40. Evidence of Mr. Morris Lewis Jr.’s financial contributions to the Sovereignty
Commission can be found in the Sovereignty Commission’s Online Repository
at http://www.mdah.ms.gov/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=imag
es/png/cd07/051214.png&otherstuff=6|70|0|84|1|1|1|50490|#.

Study the South is a peer-reviewed, multimedia, online journal, published and managed by
the Center for the Study of Southern Culture at the University of Mississippi.
1

one
two
3
three
4
four
5
five
6
six
7
seven
8
eight
9
nine
10
ten
11
eleven
12
twelve
13
thirteen
14
fourteen
15
fifteen
16
sixteen
17
seventeen
18
eighteen
19
nineteen
20
twenty
21
twenty-one
22
twenty-two
23
twenty-three
24
twenty-four
25
twenty-five
26
twenty-six
27
twenty-seven
28
twenty-eight
29
twenty-nine
30
thirty
31
thirty-one
32
thirty-two
33
thirty-three
34
thirty-four
35
thirty-five
2

Published by eGrove, 2019

23

Study the South, Art. 11 [2019]

36

thirty-six
thirty-seven
38
thirty-eight
39
thirty-nine
40
forty
41
“Indianolan Hits Food Dole Plan,” Greenville Delta Democrat-Times, 18 November 1962, box #22693
[microform], Delta Democrat-Times, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
John T. Edge, The Potlikker Papers: A Food History of the Modern South (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 50.
45
Cooley, 208.
46
Mark Newman, Divine Agitators: The Delta Ministry and Civil Rights in Mississippi (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2004), 163.
47
Cooley, 209.
48
Ibid., 209.
49
Ferris, 285.
50
John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994),
363.
51
Ibid, 370.
52
Dittmer, Local People, 368–71; Chana Kai Lee, For Freedom’s Sake: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1999) 143–47; and Woods, 196–97.
53
Levin quoted in Dittmer, Local People, 369.
54
Ibid., 370.
55
Greta de Jong, You Can’t Eat Freedom: Southerners and Social Justice after the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 64.
56
Dorsey quoted in ibid., 64.
57
Stennis quoted in Woods, 165.
58
Newman, 41.
59
Dittmer, Local People, 371.
60
Ibid., 371.
61
Johnson quoted in Woods, 196.
62
Newman, 41.
63
Dittmer, Local People, 372.
64
Ibid., 375.
65
Executive Committee Report of the Delta Ministry (October 1965) quoted in Woods, 197.
66
Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom
Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 343.
67
Dittmer, Local People, 375.
68
Woods, 197.
69
OEO investigator quoted in Dittmer, Local People, 376.
70
Dittmer, Local People, 375–76.
71
Dittmer, Local People, 377–82; Payne, 343–45; and Woods, 197.
72
Cotter’s report quoted in Dittmer, Local People, 377.
73
Bob Howie, “Today’s Lesson in Child Development,” Jackson Daily News, 25 August 1966, Box 13a, Folder: Black
Power, Mississippi Council of Human Relations Papers, 1960–80, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
74
Dittmer, Local People, 379; Payne, 345.
75
Kornbluh, 153–54.
76
A. B. Albritton, “Senators to Probe State Poverty War,” Jackson Clarion-Ledger, April 9, 1967, Robert F. Kennedy
Subject Files, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
77
Kornbluh, 153.
37

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studythesouth/11

24

Smith: Mississippi's War Against the War on Poverty: Food Power, Hunger,

78

United States Congress, Examination of the War on Poverty: Hearings before the United States Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, Ninetieth
Congress, First Session, on April 10, 1967, Washington: US Government Print Office, 642–58.
79
Kotz, 5.
80
Payne, 344.
81
United States Congress, Examination of the War on Poverty, 653–55.
82
Ibid., 655.
83
Kotz, 65.
84
Ibid., p.82; United States Congress, Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967: Hearings, Ninetieth Congress,
First Session, on S. 1131 and H.R. 6418 [and] S. 894, Washington: US Government Print Office, 334–36.
85
Kotz, 84.
86
Ibid., 85–86.
87
Ibid., 92.

Published by eGrove, 2019

25

